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Reed-Danahay challenges conventional views a. Unlike most books, which treat labor, Socialist and Communist history separately and view French Marxism as a self-conta.
The Battle of France as a subject has suffered for years in the wake of the Battle of Britain for the sole reason, Franc. Edition This book was initially planned as part of a comparative study on the implementation of the Holocaust in France, Belgium, and the Netherlands.
Not only did the study become too voluminous for an extended book chapter, but it developed into a story revealing paradoxes peculiar to the French case yet nevertheless illuminating when it comes to the dynamics of state-sponsored mass crime in general.
As a result, I decided to develop the study into a separate book, originally published in German in by Konstanz University Press. The German occupation of France from to claimed the lives of some 80, Jews.
Between March and August , 77, Jews were deported from France to Auschwitz and other extermination camps, where almost all of them were murdered in gas chambers or perished through forced labor, hunger, and violence.
Approximately 3, to 4, people perished in the internment camps on French soil, were shot as hostages, or were killed as resistance fighters.
Yet around 75 percent of the approximately , Jews who were registered in the occupied part of France in the fall of and in the unoccupied part of France in survived.
It is common knowledge that the French government, which took up residence in the spa town of Vichy in Burgundy after the military defeat of France in June , did not put up resistance when the Germans asked for support in the persecution and deportation of the Jews.
On the contrary, it initiated its own persecution agenda, in the form of anti-Jewish laws, and did not hesitate to place the French police and administration at the disposal of the Germans for raids against and deportations of Jews.
French collaboration forms the focal point of non-German research on the subject, beginning with the trailblazing books by Serge Klarsfeld, on the one hand, and Robert Paxton and Michael Marrus, on the other.
These contrasting approaches notwithstanding, the relevant research literature confronts, explicitly or implicitly, a dual paradox.
One paradoxical aspect is the apparently low level of Jewish victimization in France, where deportees comprised 25 percent of the Jewish community in , compared with 49 percent in Belgium and 76 percent in the Netherlands.
How these facts and figures should be interpreted remains a matter of both scholarly and political controversy in present-day France, a controversy to which a German scholar has, for obvious reasons, not much to contribute.
Ignoring the paradoxes outlined above, however, is not an option either. Taking the substantial differences in levels of Jewish victimization in France, Belgium, and the Netherlands as a point of departure, my own approach to the topic was initially based on hypotheses concerning structural analysis, particularly on concepts of network analysis.
These initial assumptions chiefly concerned the relative power of the core group of perpetrators, the SS and the Gestapo, within the respective occupation regimes.
This hypothesis worked well for Belgium and the Netherlands. The high victimization rate in the Netherlands was bound up with the fact that the SS was able to establish its own institutional model in which both the separate vertical integration of the police services and the exclusion of the Jews from the ordinary domestic jurisdiction were fully implemented.
In Belgium, by contrast, the SS and Gestapo apparatus remained part of the general military administration for almost the entire period of German occupation, and the administrative treatment of the Jews remained, to a certain extent, a matter of local discretion.
Initially, the SS and Gestapo apparatus in France was weak in important respects. The Wehrmacht, which was in charge of the overall occupation administration, was in a particularly strong position and was determined to prevent the SS from acquiring any competences at all.
From the fall of onward, though, the SS in France continuously gained in strength, culminating in an outright turf battle with the Wehrmacht over security issues and related competences, in which the SS ultimately prevailed.
After an initial wave of large-scale arrests and the deportation of more than 40, Jews in alone, the monthly deportation rates fell significantly from October on and never reached the initial level again.
Of course, the counterintuitive parallel between an increase in SS power and a decrease soon afterward in the intensity of deportations could have had additional causes, such as more Jews going into hiding, a decreasing inclination of local police forces to collaborate in the persecution, or even insufficient transportation capacity.
But there is clear documentary evidence that the deceleration of the pace of deportation was directly connected with the decision by the upper echelons of the SS to contain the political costs incurred by the Vichy government as a result of the massive deportations in the summer of Thus the increase in the power of the SS and the ultimate decrease in the deportations were causally linked in a paradoxical way that defied my initial assumption of a positive correlation between the strength of the perpetrator and the level of Jewish victimization.
As a result of those compromises, the lives of the majority of the Jews living in France were saved. The theoretical argument on which this contribution is based is that structural analyses of power and influence have to be complemented by causal process tracing that focuses on the actual causal mechanisms linking institutional structures to the conduct of perpetrators and their accomplices.
The principal finding is that the course of the persecution of the Jews under German occupation between and was shaped not by the positional strength of key actors as such but by the very interaction between those actors, with manifest and latent bargaining functioning as the core mechanism.
Two pieces of literature that had not yet been published when the German edition of this book was in the making proved to be particularly helpful in sharpening this argument.
However, once we compare the initial with the advanced phases of the persecution and collaboration, it becomes clear that Vichy could have said no at the very outset.
But the pragmatic-utilitarian motives ultimately prevailed when collaboration proved to be too costly in political terms.
The potential influence of the case analysis, however, stems from changing and partly counterintuitive behavioral patterns among the accomplices.
This is why the very same key figures on the French side decided to attenuate the support for the German persecution measures that they had willingly granted at earlier stages.
Identity-building efforts are prone to adopt schematic categorizations of actors and behavioral patterns. The present study, by contrast, attempts not only to qualify structural analyses but also to underline the ambiguity of role patterns and thus the opportunity to reverse a chosen course of action.
What is significant about the German persecutors is not their unrelenting drive to persecute but the flexibility they exhibited in implementing that drive and their ability to forge tactical compromises.
Categorizing actors according to fixed role patterns may facilitate the search for identity and the construction of counteridentities, but it obscures our view of role change and hence of another important dimension of causal analysis, namely, how mass crimes can be averted or, at any rate, mitigated.
It is not just the accomplices who are ambivalent figures. Their motives are not necessarily any more noble-minded than the motives of the accomplices are necessarily criminal.
This shows that morality is not powerless in the face of genocide. The thesis is that moral norms become a power factor when moral and political judgment coincide and when key players have the ability and the opportunity to influence the opportunistic political calculations of the indifferent and the accomplices.
His advice and help were absolutely indispensable to me. Jean-Marc Dreyfus was an energetic supporter from the very beginning and, since then, has consistently provided indispensable advice.
Marc Oliver Baruch preserved me from misjudgments in a number of instances and served as a role model when it came to connecting a source-based history of events with a political-historical assessment.
Michael Mayer undertook the laborious task of reviewing the passages on the first phase of the deportations of Jews and on the preparation of the ultimately failed denaturalization law and provided me with helpful comments.
Sven Reichardt and Lutz Klinkhammer drew my attention to recent studies on the history of Italian fascism that were helpful for understanding the conduct of the Italian occupying power toward the Jews in southeastern France.
To all of those mentioned in association with this project, I would like to express my very special thanks. Insa Meinen consistently supported me with countless suggestions and forms of assistance during our cooperation on two research projects.
The valuation proposed here is that the moral protest alone would not have had any effects without the mechanisms of power, which, it should be noted, the Vichy regime itself provided.
But a small number of prominent representatives of the Christian churches, though not the churches per se, nevertheless played a greater role in mobilizing the power for the good than I was originally willing to acknowledge.
They took upon themselves the equally laborious and commendable task of reading the entire German manuscript prior to its translation into English.
I am grateful to them for correcting some inaccuracies, as well as for references to additional sources and publications and to matters to which I had previously attached scant importance, such as the diplomatic pressure exerted by the US government on the Vichy regime after the first major wave of deportations in I remain indebted to Alexander Schmitz of Konstanz University Press for the professionalism, considerateness, and diplomatic persistence with which he saw the original version of this book through to publication.
Simon Fechti helped in producing the graphics, drew up the index of persons, and also provided numerous forms of technical assistance for the US edition.
Tim Vogler was responsible for converting the deportation statistics into charts. Moritz Heuberger was responsible for locating many of the English-language editions of books cited, checking the quotations, and providing the relevant page references.
To all of them, I would like to express my warmest gratitude. There are few people to whom I am more indebted. It is with utmost appreciation that I express my gratitude and acknowledgment to those who made the US edition of this book possible.
Ezra Suleiman, a friend for decades and personally involved in both Jewish and French recent history, established the contact to the University of Michigan Press.
There, Melody Herr oversaw the project with stringency and enthusiasm, the stimulating effects of which were mutually reinforcing. Susan Cronin carefully provided indispensable technical assistance while Jill Butler Wilson took care of the tedious task of copyediting the entire manuscript that was coordinated by Mary Hashman.
The Volkswagen Foundation generously funded the translation of the book from the German original.
The decisive work on the US edition, however, was done by Ciaran Cronin, my translator. This involved not only putting what I had written into flawless English prose but also discussing countless details of terminology, wording, and style, which required our exchange of dozens of e-mails and files back and forth.
The German manuscript of the present book and the revised version for translation were written mostly in Switzerland, in the Seeburg in Kreuzlingen.
I would like to express my thanks to the canton of Thurgau and to the city of Kreuzlingen for their hospitality. I beg the pardon of the Seepark administration for occasionally riding my bicycle on unmarked paths.
Within my family, the writing of this book met with special interest and support, to which the sad subject matter and the reports from the sources contributed.
I am grateful to my wife, Christiane, and my daughter Verena for cross-checking and critically commenting on the introduction. I thank Alexander and Leonie for their curiosity and their forbearance when I did not always come home punctually.
All remaining factual errors and weaknesses are entirely my responsibility. Some twenty years ago, when I started thinking about what ultimately became the subject of the present book, I met an American colleague, a guest professor at my department, with whom I shared my first vague ideas.
Although not at all in the same field, he took a spontaneous interest in my research and he told me why. His Jewish mother was deported from France under German occupation in World War II.
During the round-up prior to deportation, she literally tossed her baby boy, probably just a few weeks old, into the arms of a French woman standing at the curbside of the road.
The mother, according to all likelihood, was among those murdered in the gas chambers. The boy, however, was rescued and grew up without knowing his date of birth or original name.
His name does sound French though and although we lost sight of each other after the brief encounter in Konstanz I kept thinking, time and again, of the unlikely rescue of Richard Ned Lebow.
Which is why I dedicate this book to him in profound fondness and appreciation. Rummel, Death by Government Monopoly in the sale of ordinary goods and services is socially inefficient because it restricts output or supply.
This elementary argument has rarely been turned on its head. Many of these people had sought refuge in France against persecution by the Germans.
Most of them had been held in detention camps by the French authorities. After internment in the Drancy transit camp near Paris, the onward transport to Auschwitz followed some days or sometimes just hours later, under inhumane conditions in overfilled wagons.
These rights and duties correspond to human nature. They come from God. One can violate them but no mortal has the right to suppress them.
The Jews are men and women, just as the foreigners are men and women. One cannot do anything one pleases to these men, to these women, to these fathers and mothers.
They also belong to the human race; they are as much our brothers as the others. A Christian must not forget this.
The archbishop was unaware of the scale of the crime that had commenced in plain view. He was outraged by the fate of the people earmarked for deportation, the brutal conditions under which they were taken from the camps or arrested, and the fact that this was all being conducted with the approval of the French government in Vichy and exclusively by French authorities and police.
In other words, it was taking place in the unoccupied zone of France, where the German occupying power had not stationed troops or a police force and hence was not in a position to conduct or enforce the arrest and deportation of the Jews on its own.
In particular, it did not make any direct accusation against the government in Vichy or the French authorities and police.
Despite this, it had a profound political impact. It marked nothing less than the turning point in the persecution of the Jews in France in the years of the German occupation from to The pastoral letter of the archbishop of Toulouse ensured that other church dignitaries also made their protest public and that protests that had previously reached the leadership of the Vichy government through confidential channels now acquired public resonance.
This directly affected the domestic political power base of the Vichy regime. The Catholic Church was grateful to the regime for this. Senior Catholic clergymen had even followed with approval the anti-Jewish laws enacted by the Vichy government on its own initiative since Thus the massive protest against the deportations of the Jews did not just come unexpectedly.
It impinged on the loyalty of a bastion of the power and hence the internal cohesion of the Vichy regime. The German occupiers in particular depended on political stability in France as the precondition for exploiting the French economy for their own war effort and for a resource-efficient deployment of their own troops.
In precisely these terms, the commander of the Security Police and the Security Service Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD [Sicherheitsdienst], or BdS in Paris, Dr.
Helmut Knochen, telegraphed the section head in charge in the Reich Security Main Office Reichssicherheitshauptamt, or RSHA , Adolf Eichmann, on 25 September Around ,, or 75 percent, of the , Jews registered in France in the fall of and in the summer of survived the German occupation.
The number of victims as a percentage of the Jewish population was relatively low,2 but 80, people nevertheless fell victim to the persecution.
They were thrown at the mercy of the German perpetrators by the Vichy government and its authorities or, especially in the final year of the occupation, were captured by the German special task forces and removed from their hideouts.
Between March and August , some 77, Jews were deported to Auschwitz and other extermination and concentration camps, where they were murdered in the gas chambers or perished through slave labor, starvation, and daily violence.
Between 3, and 4, Jews perished in the detention camps on French soil. The persistent decline in the numbers of deportees in France from September onward is clearly discernible.
It was a result of considerations of political expediency on the part of the SS, which relinquished the immediate implementation of the deportation plan developed by Adolf Eichmann after the French head of government, Pierre Laval, had drawn their attention to the protest of high-level church dignitaries and the negative domestic political impact of the deportations.
Around 77,, or 24 percent, of the Jews resident in France in would nevertheless be deported to Auschwitz, where virtually all of them were murdered in the gas chambers or perished as a result of forced labor, hunger, and violence.
In the Netherlands, by contrast, the deportation rate was 73 percent , of , Copyright Wolfgang Seibel. The present study has two objectives.
First, it attempts to explain why the very same actors who radicalized the persecution of the Jews a short time later went on to contain it.
The central thesis of the study is that the dynamic of the mass crime committed against the Jews under the German occupation in France from to was steered by the ambivalence of the power-sharing arrangement and that the radicalization or containment of the persecution depended on whether the key actors on the German and French sides who were competing for shares in power were forced to include the effect of moral norms in their calculations, even though they did not share these norms themselves.
Second, the study is concerned with the conclusions to be drawn from this finding. The primary factor was the logic of reciprocity in negotiation systems, the willingness to accept immoral bargains, and the limits to which such bargains are subject.
The assumptions are based on both empirical evidence and theoretical considerations. The SS, the central agency of the persecution and terror, was initially merely one of these rivaling authorities.
But its influence increased continually from the beginning of the war onward, and its leadership left no doubt that it regarded itself as the decisive power elite in a Europe under German hegemony.
From the summer of , the SS first had to struggle to achieve the position of power in France, Belgium, and the Netherlands that it had already achieved in the Reich and in the Polish territories occupied since September The persecution of the Jews served as an important means in this power struggle in which the SS leadership sought to reconcile the political goal of relative dominance with the organizational goal of an effective administration of the persecution.
For this reason, conventional notions concerning the role played by bureaucracy in planning and realizing the persecution and extermination of the Jews need to be relativized.
Weberian concepts of bureaucracy as the backbone of a totalitarian machinery of state and as a smoothly functioning tool of a political leadership, such as those underlying earlier studies on the role of the administration in the Holocaust,6 tend to be misleading.
Closer to the reality of the National Socialist terror apparatus are contributions to the theory of bureaucracy that emphasize the competition for power and influence within and between administrative bodies7 and that do not neglect the network-like structures of the persecution apparatus.
This dependence was especially acute in the case of France because of the strategic importance of the country for the German conduct of the war.
In so doing, he overruled more far-reaching demands by Italy that would have adversely affected France. It also jealously guarded its competences in its own occupied zone in southeastern France.
In and , this would save the lives of tens of thousands of Jews who would otherwise have been arrested and deported by the French police under the collaboration agreements with the Germans.
Hitler, as he reiterated in his Directive No. This was especially true in the pivotal domain of the police, control over which was, from the German point of view, decisive for implementing the persecution measures against the Jews.
Researchers who have studied the political and administrative relations between the Germans and the French with regard to the persecution of the Jews have mainly depicted the German and French measures as being either mutually complementary or a product of direct collaboration.
Michael Mayer, in his comparative study of the roles played by the German and French ministerial bureaucracies in drafting the anti-Jewish legislation, points to the fact that the German occupying power in France was fundamentally unable to permanently cross the threshold separating segregation policy from extermination policy, because of its dependence on the French administration and police.
Its basic premise is that the powersharing arrangement between the German and French authorities gave rise to diverse forms of interaction that, in turn, had ambivalent effects on the persecution of the Jews.
The two quotations at the beginning of this introduction allude to this ambivalence. The conventional assumption formulated by Rudolph J.
Power sharing, not the monopolization of power, shaped the relations between the occupying power and the domestic authorities in this area as well.
Sometimes, the dynamic of power sharing had the effect of unleashing persecution; at other times, the absence of a German monopoly on power had the effect of containing persecution.
However, this situation in particular extended the range of practical options open to the French side. The political bargain on which the German-French agreements rested continued to include inducements for the Vichy government to cooperate in the mass arrests and deportations of the Jews, but it simultaneously included a de facto veto option.
Vichy exercised its veto option when the involvement in the mass arrests and deportations became too costly in domestic and foreign political terms.
Playing an important role instead were the relevant modes of interaction between the two sides, according to whether it placed emphasis more on rivalry or on cooperation, and the associated political cost-benefit calculation on the Vichy side.
The result of this calculation and hence the question of the expediency of the collaboration with Germany in the domain of the persecution of the Jews acquired increased importance in the stable form of state collaboration than under the unstable conditions of unclarified questions of competence and mutual rivalry.
The classification itself goes back to Raul Hilberg25 and still fulfills an important heuristic function. But it necessarily neglects the complex political and organizational conditions governing an occupying regime in which the persecution of the Jews was embedded and therefore also the constantly changing and internally contradictory configurations of the key actors and their logics of action.
Laub, in his study of the German occupation regime in France between and , analyzed the multifaceted tactical twists in occupation policy and the internal tensions and conflicts of the German occupation administration, the authorities in Berlin to which it reported, and the numerous satellite organizations in occupied France.
But they later adopted a passive stance on the implementation of the deportation and marginalized the radical antiSemites within their own government apparatus.
Mixed Motivations and the Mobilization and Demobilization of Coperpetrators The third and most important premise on which the approach of this book is based concerns the rationality governing the actions of those involved.
This issue has prompted a sometimes heated debate. The logic of political utilitarianism that spurred collaboration also operated in the opposite direction once the circumstances changed.
Nevertheless, both partners, Laval and the SS, had an alert cynical appreciation of the moral norms that shaped not only the conduct of the church dignitaries but also, in particular, the behavior of the population and the response of public opinion.
This does not mean, however, that their conduct was erratic or that the rationalities governing their conduct were themselves arbitrary. Once this plan had been adopted, the radical persecution of the Jews, including their physical elimination from mainstream society, was a fixed political goal for all of those directly or indirectly involved, independent of their own attitude, and was an operational administrative plan since the Wannsee Conference of 20 January The momentum and vehemence of the persecution of the Jews was a result of the fact that one did not need to be either a Nazi or an anti-Semite in order to participate in the persecution.
On closer inspection, this diagnosis is far more disturbing than the notion that the perpetrators and their helpers had to have had murderous motives.
If the boundaries between the perpetrators and their accomplices were fluid, perpetrators and accomplices could be indistinguishable when it came to the banality of their motives.
This normality was much more terrifying than all the atrocities put together. Opportunism or compatible interests often sufficed.
In essence, however, the banality and opportunism of coperpetrator motives is at once disturbing and reassuring. Unlike ideological zeal, opportunism is based on implicit calculation.
Once circumstances change, coperpetrator mobilization may falter as quickly as it was unleashed. To overemphasize anti-Semitism as a motivational factor in the implementation of the Holocaust would be not only to underestimate the potential for mass crime in the midst of society but also to ignore the potential for intervention and neutralization.
It is virtually impossible to change the mind-sets of zealous perpetrators, but it is possible to influence the opportunistic calculations of their accomplices.
What makes planned, organized mass criminality especially murderous is the institutionalization of diverse practical inducements. It leads to the extensive mobilization of accomplices at the periphery through the mobilization of the many partial rationalities governing the actions of various authorities and administrative branches and their numerous personnel for the centrally planned persecution and extermination process.
Whether one participated in the collective crime or not remained, as Arendt observed, an individual decision and a question of individual responsibility.
The leading representatives of the Nazi regime themselves assumed that the moral exclusion of Jews remained fragile, and they went to great lengths to continually reignite anti-Semitism among the wider population and among the intellectuals.
The leadership of the regime was well aware that the division of labor among the authorities involved and their complexity as such could not really conceal the crime.
This is why the mass murder was consistently kept secret and why euphemisms were used even in internal communication between bureaus.
By contrast, men like the cardinal and archbishop of Lyon, Pierre-Marie Gerlier, had nothing to lose by following their conscience and appealing to both the moral and the patriotic feelings of their fellow countrymen in the protest against the deportations of the Jews.
However, the moral core of these appeals was entirely free of utilitarian considerations. They are as much our brothers as the others.
This developed into the decisive barrier against the unlimited exploitation of the power-sharing arrangement between the occupying power and the representatives of the occupied country for the purposes of the persecution.
In this respect, the French case is a prime example of the mobilization and demobilization of accessories who help to launch a mass crime without intending to do so and who impede it even though they do not want to prevent it.
Research Design and Method: Identifying Causal Mechanisms and Critical Junctures, Establishing General Inferences In terms of theory and method, this study is a political science analysis of state-sponsored mass crime, informed by social science concepts of causality linking human action to structural conditions.
This leads to the question of how and to what extent the occupiers managed to exploit the power-sharing arrangement with the representatives of the occupied country for the persecution of the Jews.
The related question is where the limits of this exploitation lay and how they arose. The objective is neither the examination of covariances using a large number of cases nor the examination of single influential variables; it is, instead, theory-driven process tracing based on a single case.
Yet the SS tried, before and after the agreements with their French opposite numbers, to arrest and deport the Jews wherever possible, and thousands of Jews, in particular children, were taken in and rescued by French people.
Their behavioral patterns were shaped by individual key actors to whom the responsibility for actions and omissions can and must be ascribed.
The key players acted within an ideological and institutional context that constituted opportunities and constraints that, in turn, entailed the very causal mechanisms through which behavioral patterns were transformed into actual decisions.
We usually take for granted that the decisions of key actors were aggregated to produce a final outcome through legal and organizational implementation, although we find significant exceptions in the Italian occupation zone in southeastern France from November through September Opportunities and constraints changed over the course of time, as did the positions and practical dispositions of the key players.
Moreover, the attachment of the church to Vichy is the reason why this intervention was so effective. Clearly, therefore, structures, positions, and action strategies intermeshed in a partly counterintuitive way.
Graphic depiction of causal mechanisms. The drawback of a single case study is supposedly the lack of a test of external validity, or, to put it another way, the absence of generalizability.
This objection only applies to variable-based research in social science, however, against which it is also aimed in the relevant textbooks.
Here, too, the deportations were initiated in close collaboration with the home administration and police, only to be brought to an abrupt halt by the government; here, too, the moratorium was brought about by political pressure, specifically that of the United States and a number of neutral countries.
Without cooperation, certain problems cannot be solved. But at the same time, the occupying power will be concerned at least to defend its power advantage, whereas the representatives of the occupied country will be concerned to extend their power.
Therefore, they are predictable and hence generalizable. The same holds for bargaining, the basic mechanism that integrates rivalry and cooperation.
Bargaining is also predictable and hence generalizable, as is compromise formation based on this mechanism. Bargaining partners take their orientation both from what is acceptable as regards solving problems and from what is acceptable as regards their mutual power relations.
From the perspective of causal analysis, this is, at the same time, the essential causal mechanism linking causal factors with their effects.
The representatives of an occupying power and the representatives of an occupied country compete over a specific spectrum of key resources, but the outcome of this competitive relation cannot be predicted in advance.
Among the key resources are raw materials and productive resources and control over manpower, infrastructure, administrative apparatuses, legislative competences, and law enforcement agencies.
This situation was no different in the relations between German and French authorities in the years of the occupation. Because it was in possession of the manpower and the law enforcement agents and because the German dictator, out of military and geopolitical considerations, permitted it a government of its own, with its own legislative and administrative authority and its own armed forces in North Africa and the overseas territories, the French side had a comparatively strong starting position in the bargaining processes that were a feature of the everyday relations with the occupying power.
The representatives of the occupied country could also impose their will in particular instances against a reluctant occupying power. They naturally sought to extend these opportunities, just as the German occupiers sought to restrict them to what was unavoidable.
However, the power rationality of the French side differed in one important point from that of the German side. For the French side, the support of its own population and of societal groups was also an important factor.
But it was even possible to capitalize on this in negotiations with the occupying power. Demands for material or symbolic improvements that strengthened domestic support could be brought to bear in return for concessions that benefited the occupiers.
Conversely, precisely such concessions could occasionally be avoided by appealing to their domestic political costs.
These limitations of the assumptions concerning the characteristics of an occupying regime and the action orientations of its key players lead to the second methodological feature of this study, the specific character of causal process tracing.
A historical explanation does not rest on unfocused narratives. It is concerned with turning points and critical junctures and with identifying necessary and sufficient conditions for those decisions that render these turning points and junctures identifiable as such.
Causal mechanisms, as such, are undirected,92 and the statements by Rudolph J. Rummel and James Buchanan quoted at the beginning of this introduction acquaint us with the ambivalent effects of power sharing and bargaining.
The effects could consist just as well in the intensification as in the containment of the persecution, and apparently both situations were the case in France.
Therefore, this study leads to the further question posed by Benjamin Valentino: exactly what leads one and the same causal mechanism to unleash mass crime in one case and to impede it in another?
Organization of the Book The account of the development of and interconnections between these practical rationalities and the decisions guided by them follows the key sequences of the events that were decisive for the fate of the Jews in occupied France.
This involves four phases. During the first phase, the SS and hence the core group of the perpetrators prevailed in the power struggle with the Wehrmacht.
The second phase marked the consolidation of the increase in power of the SS. This was the result of an arrangement with the government in Vichy. It was based on a compromise that epitomized the logic of collaboration in the area of policing.
These accords were sealed with the so-called Oberg-Bousquet agreement of 8 August , which marks the conclusion of this phase. The protest of the two Christian churches spread once deportations began from provincial regions of the unoccupied zone as well, as was envisaged by the Oberg-Bousquet agreement.
With the protest of the church, one of the domestic political pillars of Vichy, the persecution of the Jews suddenly became a matter of regime cohesion.
The fourth and longest phase was marked by the further distancing of the government in Vichy from the collaboration with the German occupying power in the persecution of the Jews.
They took care, as far as was possible, of the business of the Germans when it came to the persecution of the Jews.
The last deportation trains left France in August By this time, the system of state collaboration at all levels and the smoothly functioning exploitation of the French police for the persecution of the Jews were already things of the past.
But the Germans had planned it, and without the presence of the German Wehrmacht it would never have materialized. Moreover, it would be pointless to ignore the particular lessons to be learned from that interaction.
The present analysis reveals how power and morality were interlinked in the developing relations between perpetrators and collaborators and how morally indifferent collaborators and even ruthless perpetrators could be forced to acknowledge the power of morality once the latter gained momentum both in circles close to the regime and in public opinion.
Also of importance was the extended preparatory phase of the military strategy in Western Europe. This preparation, also as regards the occupation administration, was largely under the control of the Wehrmacht.
In this regard, the latter worked closely with experts of the civilian Reich administration. The main purpose was to mobilize the economic power of the occupied territories for German purposes.
Although the Wehrmacht also exercised administrative functions in the rear military areas in the war against the Soviet Union in Serbia, Greece, and North Africa , it did so there under completely different conditions of an occupation situation defined primarily in military terms.
Both the influence exerted by Himmler on appointments to the upper echelons of the administration in the Netherlands and his repeated attempts to have a civil administration with an HSSPF established in Belgium indicate that he was well aware of the relative weakness of his position.
The persecution of the Jews in Western Europe from to followed the pattern of institution building and progressive escalation established in Germany proper, in Austria, and in the Nazi-established Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia.
These measures were followed by deportation and extermination. This was due, in the first instance, to the internal contradictions of German policy toward the countries concerned.
These contradictions not only brought to light conflicts between the German actors but also broadened the scope for action of the domestic actors.
Both factors had ambivalent repercussions for the persecution of the Jews. The supposition that the power enjoyed by the SS and police apparatus in particular had profound repercussions for the persecution of the Jews is trivial.
It is indeed evident that the initial position created by the respective occupation regimes for the SS and Gestapo to enforce the persecution measures, at least in the area of police repression, was of supreme importance.
Under these conditions, a vertical and a horizontal axis of power sharing emerged. If the aim was to husband German resources and to mobilize domestic resources on a sustainable basis, the German occupier also had to share the power, to a certain extent, with the home authorities.
In the horizontal axis, by contrast, in the relations of German actors among themselves, power rivalries developed of the kind that also marked the National Socialist system of rule in the Reich.
The multidimensional character of the division of power in the occupied territories of Western Europe granted the key players considerable leeway for action, which they sought, to different extents, to exploit for their own purposes and goals.
Even though these purposes and goals may have followed a general line as was undoubtedly the case with the persecution of the Jews , they were heterogeneous and volatile when it came to specifics.
These contradictions would have inevitably led to substantial problems in the occupation policy even if, in other respects, the German side had had clear strategic concepts for dealing with the occupied territories and unambiguous regulations regarding competences.
But there was no such clarity. This could not fail to lead to permanent incoherence in the occupation policy. This was astonishing for contemporaries in the case of a regime that had the aura of a tightly run dictatorship and an effective administration.
What relative weights should be accorded to these goals and how these overall objectives should best be accomplished, however, remained objects of internal disputes.
The individual branches of power could mobilize the support of central Reich authorities or of leading representatives of the regime, including Hitler himself, on a case-by-case basis.
However, heterogeneous ideological fronts and interests developed here too, depending not least on the course of the war and hence on the German power potential in Europe.
A fundamental line of conflict was that between those who regarded collaboration with the German occupying power and those who regarded passive or active resistance as the appropriate strategy in the struggle to promote national interests.
Precisely analogous to relations on the German side, the collaborators included ideologues and pragmatists, depending on whether the individuals concerned believed they should cooperate with the Germans on ideological grounds or for reasons of expediency.
Under these conditions, a stable axis of cooperation was most likely to develop between the pragmatists on both sides.
This cooperation was threatened by the incoherence of the occupation policy on the German side and, naturally, by the organized resistance on the side of the occupied countries.
Both factors were destined to destabilize the cooperative relations as the war persisted. In the occupied western territories, the expansion and intensification of the German war economy from the first half of onward23 led to an increased demand for labor and to more immediate interventions in the national economies concerned.
In addition, there was progressive deterioration of the military position of the Reich from the fall of onward.
These two factors reduced the willingness of the ideologically indifferent forces in the occupied countries to collaborate and strengthened the willingness of the opposition forces to engage in active resistance.
With this, there could be no real question of power-sharing relations, at least in the vertical axis. Like the rule of the National Socialist regime in the Reich proper, the final phase of the occupation was marked by a surge in coercion, violence, and terror in Western Europe.
The systematic execution of the anti-Jewish policy was initiated in the Netherlands, Belgium, and France in the fall of The sequence of persecution measures and related stages of radicalization until the spring of corresponded, in essence, to those in the Reich until the onset of the mass deportations in the fall of This development took a more or less homogeneous course in Western Europe.
However, there were profound differences in how the enforcing authorities were established, both in comparison to the Reich and among the three Western European countries.
These differences, in turn, had lasting repercussions for the actual enforcement of the persecution. Already in the Reich, the authorities charged with enforcing the persecution of the Jews were centralized in varying degrees.
The police side of the persecution was under the direction of the Reich Security Main Office and was implemented by the regional and local agencies of the Gestapo under its direct control.
The SS and police authorities strove to realize this centralization also in the occupied Western European countries, though they met with very uneven success there.
In the Netherlands, supreme police authority lay with the German general commissioner for security, who was simultaneously HSSPF and hence embodied the principle of the amalgamation of party organizations SS, SD and state police realized in the Reich Security Main Office and claimed the authority to issue directions to the Dutch police.
In Belgium, the police authority resided with the military commander, hence the Wehrmacht, until July In fact, one cannot assume that a linear relation existed between a more pronounced hierarchization of the occupation administration and a greater centrality of the SS and Gestapo in the occupation system, on the one hand, and the level of implementation of the intentions to persecute the Jews, on the other.
If the Reich Security Main Office succeeded in making the latter, through glaring deficiencies in domestic and military security and political stability, look incompetent in the eyes of the upper echelons of the regime if possible, of Hitler himself , it could hope for an increase in authority and power.
This tactic would succeed at least in the Netherlands and France. In the Netherlands, political strikes in February lead to a strengthening of the position of the SS and Gestapo apparatus as regards competences in the persecution of the Jews; in France, through attacks on Paris synagogues in October , the SS provoked heightened tensions that ultimately resulted in the appointment of an HSSPF in May In the area of the economic persecution of the Jews, the competences were already spread over different administrative areas in Germany proper.
The most important authorities, aside from the apparatus of the SS and Gestapo, were the so-called regional economic advisers Kreiswirtschaftsberater of the NSDAP, the financial administration and the plenipotentiary for the Four-Year Plan.
At this time, the efforts of the SS leadership to concentrate competences in both the police and the economic persecution of the Jews in Germany proper were focused primarily on the plundering of the Jews in connection with the emigration.
The regular occupation administrations did not allow their competences in the economic domain to be withdrawn, even where the Jews were concerned the plundering of the Jews by the Gestapo in the immediate context of the arrests and deportations remained unaffected by this, of course.
This reflected the primacy of the general occupation policy, whose overall objective focused on the economic exploitation of the occupied territories.
The extent to which tasks and hence also power were divided between the German and the home authorities in the domain of the economic persecution of the Jews varied even more than in that of the persecution through police repression.
As a French institution on Belgian territory, the latter was subject to the enemy assets administration and, as a result, enabled the occupier to exercise more direct control by comparison with the Brussels Trust.
In France, by contrast, jurisdiction for the persecution of the Jews in the economic area was entirely under French control. This division corresponded to the directives given to the German negotiators by Hitler, who accorded priority over other occupation policy considerations to the enduring split in the alliance between France and England.
Of decisive importance in the case of a continuation of the war against England, according to Hitler, were the loyalty of the French colonies toward a mother country that had withdrawn from the war and, for this reason, the existence of a French government as a sovereign entity with its own territory.
As heads of the civilian administration, they were in charge of the entire administration in the civilian area, which amounted to an annexation.
After the Allied landing in North Africa on 8 November , the Wehrmacht took control of large areas of the Free Zone by 12 November The first military governor of Paris, which was occupied by German troops on 14 June , was General Alfred von Vollard-Bockelberg, followed from 30 June by General Alfred Streccius as head of the military administration.
Under the authority of the military commander were a command staff to lead the occupation troops and an administrative staff. Typical of the practice of military posting, the leadership of the command staff was subject to greater fluctuation than that of the administrative staff.
Between and , the command staff was led by five successive high-level officers Auleb, Speidel, Kossmann, Linstow, and Krause , of whom the future supreme commander of the NATO troops in Europe, Hans Speidel, is the most important figure historically.
Bearer of the Gold Honor Party Badge Goldenes Parteiabzeichen , Schmid could count as the representative of the NSDAP in the military administration in Paris.
Both the German and the French sides maintained the legal fiction that the armistice of 22 June was itself not affected by the expansion of German and Italian military presence in southeastern France.
The map depicts, accordingly, both the demarcation line between the northern and the southern zones and the thinner line demarcating the expanded Italian occupation zone that existed between 11 November and 8 September , when the Italian armed forces surrendered to the Allies.
A reckless manhunt for the Jews in the previous Italian occupation zone followed when the Germans took control. Copyright Bundesarchiv.
The administrative staff was subdivided into the Administration Section and the Economics Section. From August to June , the Administration Section was led by Dr.
Franz Medicus, who assumed responsibility in September for the administrative group with the quartermaster general in the Army High Command and later coordinated the reporting of the deactivation staffs.
From September to August , the Administration Section was led by Dr. Wilhelm Gustav Ermert. Throughout the occupation, the Economics Section was under the direction of Dr.
Elmar Michel, who, as mentioned, headed the entire administrative staff in personal union from August onward. Group 1, General Affairs and De-jewification, of Subsection Wi I, under chief military administrative counselor Dr.
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